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1.

INTRODUCTION

The Egyptian revolution is proving to be a very legal one. That
is not to say that the revolution’s demands have been legalized, or
that Egypt’s law has been revolutionized. Rather, the forces that
have come to the fore since the toppling of Mubarak in February
2011 have chosen law as the privileged form through which to
bargain with each other. The density of the legal back and forth
has
been
overwhelming—constitutional
amendments,1
* Professor of Law, Georgetown Law Center; LL.B., University of Jordan;
LL.M., University of Bristol, UK; MA Philosophy, University of York, York, UK;
S.J.D., Harvard Law School.
1 In the aftermath of the revolution, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces
(“SCAF”) suspended the 1971 constitution and appointed a special committee, the
Constitutional Reform Committee, to draft constitutional amendments to allow
for the transition to a new system of governance. See Power or Glory: How
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constitutional supplementary declarations,2 parliamentary laws,
legislative amendments,3 military decrees,4 court trials,5
Successive Constitutional Changes Limit Egypt’s Presidency, EGYPT.COM (June 24,
2012, 1:40 PM), http://news.egypt.com/english/permalink/126999.html.
A
national referendum held in March 2011 approved the amended constitution by a
majority vote of 77%. See al-Natījah: Na’am bi-Nisbit 77.3% [Result: Yes by 77.3%],
ISTIFTA’A.
MIṢR
[REFERENDUM.
EGYPT],
http://www.referendum.eg/84slideshow/155-result.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2012) (Egypt). For a complete list
of the proposed constitutional amendments, see Nuṣūṣ al-Ta‘dīlāt [Constitutional
Amendments], ISTIFTA’A. MIṢR [REFERENDUM. EGYPT], http://www.referendum.eg/
2011-03-13-00-09-44.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2012) (Egypt). Later on, SCAF
changed course and rejected the amended constitution, as approved by the
referendum, and unilaterally issued a provisional constitutional declaration to
serve as an interim constitution until a new constitution is drafted. For the full
text of the provisional constitution, see al-I’alān al-Dusturī 2011 [Constitutional
Declaration 2011], BIWĀBAT AL-ḤUKŪMAH AL-MIṢRĪYAH [EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT
PORTAL], http://www.egypt.gov.eg/arabic/laws/constitution/default.aspx (last
visited Nov. 15, 2012) (Egypt) (citing sixty-three articles, in comparison to the 1971
Constitution’s 211 articles).
2
On June 2012, SCAF issued a supplementary constitutional declaration
amending provisions of the earlier constitutional declaration of March 2011. The
Constitutional Declaration (with June 17, 2012 Annex), CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR
INT’L PEACE (Oct. 17, 2012), http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/
2012/06/19/the-constitutional-declaration-with-june-17-2012-annex-added.
3 The legislative drafting committee of the People’s Assembly approved a bill
that amends the presidential elections law by adding a provision, which may be
applied retroactively, that excludes members of the former ruling party from
holding the positions of President, Vice President, Prime Minister, or Government
Minister for ten years. This is known as the “Political Isolation Law.” Cf. Major
Court Cases in Egypt’s Transition, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE,
http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2012/07/02/major-court-casesin-egypt’s-transition (last visited Jan. 20, 2013) (noting that the Supreme
Constitutional Court invalidated this law, permitting Ahmed Shafiq to remain a
candidate). On a different matter, the People’s Assembly approved the
abolishment of Article 6 of the Law on the Military Judiciary, which allows the
President to refer civilians for trial before military courts. However, the Assembly
approved a revision of Article 48 of the Law, which provides the military judicial
authority and sole jurisdiction over certain types of crimes, regardless of whether
they were committed by a civilian or a member of the military. See Egypt: People’s
Assembly Amends Law of 1996 on Military Judiciary, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205403135_text
(last
updated May 8, 2012).
4 Military decrees were issued to replace the amended constitution approved
by a national referendum, to amend the law governing the Supreme
Constitutional Court (“SCC”) regarding the appointment of its president, to
dissolve the elected parliament, to amend the election law (to allow political
parties to field candidates in the one-third of seats that had previously been
reserved for independent candidates), and to eventually issue a new
supplementary constitution (right after the presidential elections). See Nathan J.
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constitutional court decisions overturning laws passed,6
presidential decrees,7 and emergency laws annulled and then
reclaimed in another form.8 In fact, there was so much back and
forth that to trace the historical unfolding of the Egyptian
revolution, one would be wise to use the Official Gazette and law
reports as a primary guide through this maze of events. It is hard
to miss the fact that in the case of Egypt, no sooner had the public
Brown, The Egyptian Political System in Disarray, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L
PEACE, http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2012/06/19/the-egyptianpolitical-system-in-disarray (last visited Jan. 23, 2013).
5 For example, the Egyptian Supreme Administrative Court disbanded the
National Democratic Party (Mubarak’s pre-revolution ruling party). In another
case, the Administrative Judicial Court issued a decision suspending the
constitutional panel that included one hundred members (half of whom were
parliamentarians representing Islamic interest groups) and assigned
parliamentarians to select experts and individuals who do not belong to the
legislative branch to join the panel. Another tribunal, the Supreme Electoral
Commission of Egypt, disqualified ten presidential candidates from the upcoming
presidential race because they were in violation of the country’s election laws. See
Major Court Cases in Egypt’s Transition, supra note 3 (listing major post-revolution
judicial decisions). Finally, Egypt’s Criminal Court in Cairo ruled that the Muslim
Brotherhood is legal, and that the 1954 decision to ban it is null and void. See
Sarah Paulsworth, Paper Chase: Cairo Court Voids 1954 Ban on Muslim Brotherhood,
JURIST (July 4, 2012, 10:53 PM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2012/07/cairocourt-voids-ban-on-muslim-brotherhood.php
(finding
that
the
Muslim
Brotherhood had been in compliance with existing laws at the time of its origin).
6 The SCC ruled in June 2012 that the political isolation law that bars old
regime officials from running on the presidential ballot is unconstitutional. Major
Court Cases in Egypt’s Transition, supra note 3. The Court further ruled that onethird of the seats in the Lower House of the Egyptian Parliament were invalid,
and ordered the dissolution of the entire parliament. Case no. 20/2012/Supreme
Constitutional
Court
(Egypt),
available
at
http://www.earla.org/
userfiles/file/Case%20No_%2020%20of%20the%2034th%20Judicial%20Year.pdf.
Commentators described these decisions as the “Judicial Coup.”
7 Immediately after his election, Egypt’s President Morsi issued a presidential
decree that invited the dissolved parliament to reconvene and to exercise its
prerogatives (despite SCC and SCAF orders). The July 8, 2012 presidential decree
also called for the election of a new legislature within sixty days of the ratification
of a new constitution. See Ivana Assy et al., Presentation and Full English Text of
Morsi’s Decree Restoring Parliament, AHRAMONLINE (July 9, 2012),
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/0/47250/Egypt/Presentation-andfull-English-text-of-Morsis-decre.aspx.
8 SCAF lifted the Emergency Law on May 31, 2012. However, prior to the
presidential election, the army-backed government issued a decree giving the
military the power to arrest civilians, in essence reviving the Emergency Law.
The Supreme Administrative Court later annulled this governmental decree. See
Major Court Cases in Egypt’s Transition, supra note 3 (reporting on the declaration
that the Military Police Law was unconstitutional).
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space opened up for the political as an autonomous sphere—one
that is only possible through genuine democratic practice—than it
was annexed by the legal.
2.

LEGALIZING THE POLITICAL AND POLITICIZING THE LEGAL

Ironically, just as the political forces expectantly turned to law
and its institutions to mediate and arbitrate their raging battles, the
Egyptian judiciary left its chambers and marched into the public
sphere. In doing so, it turned itself into a public interlocutor by
holding press conferences, appearing on TV talk shows, and
making statements to the foreign press, explaining and defending
its decisions to the public. Through these actions, the judiciary
participated directly in the political debates that had dominated
Egypt since the revolution,9 sometimes even openly favoring one
side over the other.10 While the political forces legalized their
bargaining maneuvers, the judiciary politicized its role, refusing to
grant whatever “cover of law” the political forces sought to acquire
from it. In doing so, the judiciary seemingly denied itself the
veneer of “objectivity and neutrality,” the public performance that
sustains its high social status and privileges, choosing to blow the
cover of the political forces and call their bluff, so to speak!
The public watched the national judiciary closely, longing for a
just and “revolutionary” resolution of the persistent political
uncertainty and angst that had been hanging over the skies of
Egypt since the revolution. Although the public had idealistically
hoped that the Court’s enforcement of the law would clear Egypt’s
dark skies, it quickly surmised that this was the corrupt judiciary
of Mubarak—dependent, abject, self-interested, and incompetent.
Having failed to provide the “revolutionary” answer to the
9 The SCC released a statement to the media in response to the President’s
July 8, 2012 decree to reinstate the parliament, proclaiming that its decisions “are
final and not subject to appeal, and that its provisions in cases of constitutional
interpretation and decisions are binding on all state authorities.” See Egypt’s High
Constitutional Court Tells President Calls [sic] Its Decisions ‘Final, Binding,’
AHRAMONLINE (July
9, 2012), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/
1/64/47248/Egypt/Politics-/In-response-to-presidential-decree,-Egypts-HighCo.aspx.
10 For an extreme example of this, see Justice Tahani el-Gebali’s statement to
the New York Times regarding the judiciary’s role in keeping the military in power.
David D. Kirkpatrick, Judge Helped Egypt’s Military to Cement Power, N.Y. TIMES
(July 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/04/world/middleeast/judgehelped-egypts-military-to-cement-power.html?pagewanted=all.
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political “stuckness” of post-revolutionary Egypt, the judiciary
quickly turned itself into the very cause for revolution.
Things were a bit more complicated of course. The judiciary’s
performance had sufficient nuance; its overall failure to satisfy
“revolutionary” desire in the law was interspersed with some
successes which kept lawyers coming back to knock on the courts’
gates. Sometimes, it seemed that litigants were driven not by any
faith in the courts themselves, but rather by an ideal of the rule-oflaw state that they hoped would suddenly metamorphose before
their eyes if they only kept up hope and kept coming back.11
The legalization of political battles and the public scandal
caused by the Egyptian judiciary’s failure to satiate the public’s
need for the “revolutionary” answer seemed to turn every newly
politicized Egyptian citizen into a lawyer. If the rule-of-law was
out there, but the judiciary refused to pick it up, then (“by Jove”)
Ahmad and Adel were going to. They were going to tell anyone
who bothered to ask, in legalistic terms, how the court had failed to
rule legally—how it failed to assert its own jurisdiction when it
should have, how it claimed jurisdiction it should not have, how it
upheld bad law about military trials, and how it overturned good
law about parliamentary elections. This type of widespread
political discourse was an exciting development in Egyptian
society and served as a slap in the face of social hierarchy and all
its concomitant privileges. There is something very exciting about
this popularization of legal talk, which could be seen as an
11 For example, following its reinstatement by presidential decree (after its
dissolution by SCC and SCAF), the elected Egyptian parliament decided to submit
the question of its very legality, which was uncertain after the SCC ruling, to the
Cassation Court. The Court eventually decided that it lacked jurisdiction to
consider the case. See Alaa Shahine, Egypt Appeals Court Rejects Requests to Hear
Parliament
Case,
BLOOMBERG
(July
14,
2012,
8:34
AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-14/egypt-appeals-court-rejectsrequests-to-hear-parliament-case-1-.html (noting that the ruling was unanimous);
Egypt Presidency Declines to Comment on Court Ruling Against Restoration of
Parliament, AHRAMONLINE (July 10, 2012), http://english.ahram.org.eg/
NewsContent/1/64/47385/Egypt/Politics-/Egypt-presidency-declines-tocomment-on-court-ruli.aspx (reporting that President Morsi’s office capitulated to
the Court of Cassation ruling). See also Paulsworth, supra note 5 (discussing the
Criminal Court’s decision to void the 1954 ban against the Muslim Brotherhood);
Case no. 20/2012/Supreme Constitutional Court (Egypt), available at
http://www.earla.org/userfiles/file/Case%20No_%2020%20of%20the%2034th%
20Judicial%20Year.pdf (holding unconstitutional several provisions contained
within Legislative Decree Nos. 120, 108, and 123, which were issued in 2011,
amending the Parliament law, Law No. 38 of 1972).
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example of people “taking the law into their own hands”—the
layman demystifying the rule of the “expert”, an in-your-face
busting of social hierarchy and all its concomitant privileges. Thus,
in a very short period of time, one witnessed in the case of Egypt
an interesting way of testing the limits of the rule-of-law state.
This occurred not through critique—as happens in Western
countries where the rule-of-law is thick—but rather through an
overturning of hierarchy, where every citizen becomes the judge
and legal language is popularized—its technical, mystifying
quality flattened, made simple, and accessible, to be digested by
the lay mind.
3.

WHAT WOULD A “PROPER JUDICIARY” HAVE DONE?

Could the Egyptian judiciary have acted differently? Could it
have carried the day and arbitrated the conflicts between the
political forces as objectively and neutrally as was expected of it?
Could it have done so persuasively to the contending parties,
allowing the judiciary to claim the mantle of autonomy from the
executive and the legislature?
Many decried the behavior of the Egyptian judiciary as
symptomatic of a pliant judiciary—a residue of an ancien régime
that refused to drop old habits, but instead, simply replaced
Mubarak with the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (“SCAF”).
Had the judiciary behaved more autonomously, many thought,
then the legal battles would have ended differently and favored
the “revolution.”
But this argument ignores that a judiciary capable of acting
independently is one already buffeted by a robust political
sphere—one in which political forces feel no compulsion to legalize
their primary political battles in the first place. In such a sphere,
political forces bargain with each other politically, following
background bargaining rules known to all, whether those rules are
legal in the formal sense or merely customary. In other words, an
independent judiciary is only possible when it intervenes to settle
disputes among political players only marginally, and only when
there is confusion about the background bargaining rules or how
to interpret the outcome of bargaining once it has taken place. In
these cases, the judiciary—no matter how high the stakes—can
intervene to shift the interpretation of the background rules or
change the political outcome by privileging one side over the other
through its decision, while still appearing objective and neutral. It
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can do all that while not appearing as an actual participant in the
political dispute. Of course, the losing side may accuse the court of
acting politically, as happened in Bush v. Gore.12 However, courts
usually survive the day because of the marginality of such cases in
the overall docket of the court.
Still, courts, especially
constitutional courts like the Supreme Court of the United States,
deal with many cases with significant political consequences.13
Even so, American political arguments usually settle outside the
court system, evidenced by their continuous coverage in the news.
Politics happens as of course—its basic outline clear to all
participants. When this occurs, and courts are spared the burden
of delineating the outline itself in a society that aspires to be
democratic, then courts can get away with acting “independently.”
In short, an independent judiciary can exist only where there is
an active political sphere. The quality of “independence” in a
judiciary is not merely a function of the personal virtue its
members would either enjoy or fail to enjoy. It is also a function of
the social organization of the state, just as corruption of state
officials is a function of the economic and social organization of the
state.
4.

UNDER THE DICTATORSHIP

Of course, such conditions hardly prevailed under Mubarak,
whose dictatorship absorbed the judiciary into its machinations of

12 On December 12, 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court terminated recounts of
election ballots in Florida, effectively awarding the presidential election to the
Republican Party candidate, George W. Bush. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
(2000). The Court’s five most conservative Justices (all appointed by Republican
presidents) constituted the majority on the 5-4 decision. See Bush v. Gore, OYEZ,
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2000/2000_00_949/#sort=ideology. For
a criticism of the decision, see, for example, ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME
INJUSTICE: HOW THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED ELECTION 2000 (2002) (arguing that,
because the conservative Justices voted according to political ideology or
preferences, the decision “may be ranked as the single most corrupt decision in
Supreme Court history.”).
13 On June 28, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.), known as
“Obamacare”), which represents the most significant federal law overhaul of the
U.S. health care system. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566
(2012).
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power.14 There have been periods and instances where the
judiciary fought the dictatorship, including the High
Administrative Court’s famous anti-Mubarak rulings and the
period in the 1990s when the Supreme Constitutional Court took
seriously the Egyptian constitution’s bill of rights, issuing several
rulings that pushed for greater democratic representation. Judicial
decisions that overturn laws that cement repression, or decisions
that declare illegal unfair state actions, abuses of authority, or
corruption (and in the past twenty years there has been several of
those), signal gestures of independence by the judiciary.15 But such
acts of defiance, against a background of dictatorial rule
interspersed with contrary acts of compliance by the same
judiciary, signal less a thick judicial sphere acting legally than a
political sphere in which the judiciary carefully calculates its
position. Because of the high stakes for the judiciary when it
stands up to the repressive regime, its discrete acts of opposition
signal a deliberate political act of its own. And since underneath
the thin veneer of legality, there is a thick and overbearing political
consideration, one loses the sense that what is being undertaken is
a legal interpretive activity, a judge reading the law objectively and
neutrally, as the “Rule of Law ideology” would have him do. In
other words, one might describe those acts as “independent” but
not exactly “judicial” even though they are the outcome of a
judicial act and issued in the form of court decisions. What is
gained in acts of “independence” by the “judiciary” is lost in the
performance of “a separate judicial sphere” because the element of
calculation in the issued ruling is transparent when judged within
the overall context of the behavior of the particular court over time.
It is as if, in order to be deemed independent, the judge must cease
being a judge altogether!
A parallel perception develops in the collective mind of the
judges’ national audience. Contemptuous of the dictator’s law and
longing for justice and vindication from an alternative authority,
the public turns to the judiciary. It pays little attention to the laws
themselves or to the nature of judicial activity. It shows scant
14 See generally Lama Abu Odeh, The Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt: The
Limits of Liberal Political Science and CLS Analysis of Law Elsewhere, 59 AM. J. COMP.
L. 985 (2011) (chronicling the intermittently independent and influential Egyptian
Supreme Constitutional Court in the two decades leading up to the 2011
revolution).
15 Id.
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interest in comprehending the machinations of interpretations or
the judicial interpretive ethos that the judges see themselves
obeying, even if only on the surface of their consciousness. For the
judges’ audience, “standing for” becomes synonymous with
adjudicating, and “rightness and justice” becomes synonymous
with law. Thus, law loses its most basic quality—textuality—and
judicial activity loses its most basic feature—interpretation. It does
not matter how interpretively persuasive the judge in a given
instance might be. As long as the decision does not correspond
with the “rightness and justice” of the situation, the judge is not
deemed to have acted independently. Conversely, the audience
might feel vindicated and rejoice with delight at the specter of an
“independent” judge (the judge opposing the dictator), and the
judge might savor the popularity. But what has been lost in this
latter moment of joint elation is the idea of the judiciary itself. It is
not just when the judiciary is compliant that it ceases to be a
“judiciary” in the proper sense. The same happens when exactly
the opposite occurs—when it acts independently.
5.

AFTER THE REVOLUTION

While SCAF has replaced Mubarak as the remaining
“authoritarian” representative, the dictatorship no longer acts with
the same robustness it had before the revolution. New political
forces have come to the fore as a result of the revolution, especially
the Islamic forces, whose absence was notable during the time of
the dictatorship. The loosening up of the political sphere should,
on principle, allow the judiciary room to maneuver, as it does not
have to remain beholden to one dominant dictatorial force, and
could therefore avoid being absorbed in the political machination
of the time. Such a possibility is at least open to an independently
minded judiciary, which I will define here as: inclined to be
politically opposed to the trappings of dictatorial rule, which could
conceivably emerge from the bosom of the present judiciary. After
all, it is not uncommon to hear in Egypt: “There is no independent
judiciary here, though there are independent judges.”
6.

DIFFERENT LOGICS

But this “born-again” judiciary finds itself confronting
paradoxical and contradictory demands, which it is hard to see
how it could possibly manage, even if it were to call upon its most
“independently” minded judges to meet those demands. The
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judiciary has to delineate the contours of the political sphere anew,
while acting “independently” of it. And at the same time, the
judiciary has to maintain “interpretive fidelity” to the legal
materials, as defined by the “Rule of Law ideology,” without
which it cannot establish its “judicial-ness”, i.e., its autonomy as a
sphere of the state. On top of all that, the judiciary’s decisions
must correspond to a revolutionary expectation of “rightness and
justice” to make it all worthwhile in the end.
Viewed more closely, two of those demands—“judicial-ness”
(interpretive fidelity to the legal materials) and independence
(from the political sphere)—belong to the Rule of Law ideology.
The third demand—rulings that correspond with “rightness and
justice”—belongs to the idea of “Revolution.” This last demand
assumes that the judges’ fidelity is to the ideas of “rightness and
justice,” the principles that mobilized the people to Tahrir Square.
Whatever legal materials are before them, judges should interpret
those materials in light of those principles. In other words, in order
to comply with the principles of rightness and justice, the judiciary
has to immerse itself in the “politics” of Revolution, foregoing
interpretive fidelity to the legal materials for the benefit of fidelity
to principles.
Rule of Law and Revolution, therefore, belong to two different
“logics” that are in tension with each other, even though, the one,
Rule of Law, is often the historical genealogical descendant of the
other, Revolution; and even though (and here’s the rub) the
demand of the Egyptian revolution has been the Rule of Law state.
7.

THE LOGIC OF REVOLUTION

Arguably, Revolution is the Rule of Law before “The Fall,” or
“The Big Bang” if you like. Revolution is the moment when all the
spheres are condensed into one; where their implosion has yet to
occur as independent spheres; where the text has yet to separate
from “principle” and acquire its maddening interpretive quality;
where the Rule of Law state has yet to be birthed. At this collective
moment, the screams on Tahrir—“Bread, Freedom, Social
Justice”—yield their meaning without textuality intervening
between the intention of the people and their words; the
revolutionary “subject’ is there to inform us of what they mean, not
in the sense that informing us is occurring orally, rather than in a
written fashion (although that too!), but rather, that the enormity of
the event in its earth-shattering transformation leaves no
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ambiguity as to what is desired. It is when all that is utopian is
real.
At that moment, “law” does not belong to the Rule of Law. It
is something altogether different: it is the simple working out in
deductive fashion of the meaning of “Bread, Freedom, and Social
Justice”! It is when deduction is most transparent, determinate,
and necessary—made stable by revolutionary desire that infuses
the air. The Revolution hovers as a meaning-stabilizer working as
direct inspiration to “law.”
Revolution not only removes the barrier of textuality from its
project of self-projection unto the future, it also dismantles all those
other past texts that bedeviled its subjects with its sadistic
indeterminacy used by power to stabilize their oppression. Law
that is good combined with law that is bad, a civilian court with an
emergency court, a democratically legislated law that is also a
dictatorial one, text upon text in which legality, as indeterminate
textuality, produced them determinedly and always as
“criminals.”
The Revolution, as the set of principles that end all texts, begins
as a criminal act against the state, in which one’s criminality in the
eyes of the state and its law is rudely and fearlessly returned back
to the state with, “J’accuse!” The accuser (the state) becomes the
accused, and the accused (the Revolutionary) becomes the accuser.
In this fashion, by staring the state in the eye when she had always
been stared down by the state, the Revolutionary puts the state in
its proper place. We all remember that famous lunge on the bridge
over the Nile, when the multitude lunged forward towards the riot
police stacked up with their latest riot gear (supplied by the good
offices of the United States), and, much to the multitude’s surprise
and to the surprise of those who were watching, the police bolted
back in fear.16 At that moment, the state with its towering
authority crumbled, and the alienated powers of the collective
projected unto the state were returned back to their original
owners with a vengeance so sweet that history had to record.
Indeed, after that bolt, the rest was history!
16 See freemanfilmsuk, 10’000 Egyptian Protestors Force Police to Retreat Over
Bridge,
YOUTUBE
(JAN.
28.
2011),
http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=rXbRdumboZ0 (amateur video of the protest); Kareem Fahim, Egyptian
Hopes Converged in Fight for Cairo Bridge, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/29/world/middleeast/29cairo.html.
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The Revolution is therefore doubly an “outlaw/law-that-is-outthere”: it eliminates the legal texts of the state it puts in its proper
place, and it reduces law into principle, eliminating the textuality
that typically haunts the gap between law and principle in
situations that are not revolutionary.
8.

THE LOGIC OF THE RULE OF LAW

Law is politico-phobic within the Rule of Law.
Law’s
utopianism lies in its insistence on a clean and clear separation
from the political. For the “subject” of the Rule of Law—the
judiciary, Revolution smacks of the sphere of the political, where
the messiness and ambiguity of power and resistance take place.
The judiciary therefore cares not for Revolution as an event in new
time, only what Revolution has managed to pass in legislative
texts. The universals of Revolution yield no definite answer the
judiciary wishes to read. Whatever principles Revolution may
have enunciated that have turned into legal rules—that is the stuff
of the Rule of Law.
And even though legal rules are framed in the shape of
“universals”—generalities addressing all, the equality of the rules
is only formal. Rules, whatever their content might be, apply
equally to all with no exception. The equality opened up by the
universals of Revolution is, on the other hand, deep and cut
through the formal flesh straight to the substance of the bone.
Universals are an invitation to “Bread, Liberty and Social Justice”
for all, no exception.
And while Revolution challenges the authority of the state by
putting the state in its proper place so that revolutionary subjects
can take back whatever power they have projected unto it, the Rule
of Law puts the power back in the state. Unlike Revolution, Rule
of Law is invested in exaggerating the power of the state because it
speaks with the authority of the state outside of which it yields no
meaning. Indeed Rule of Law affirmatively uses the power of the
state to sanction and punish.
And unlike Revolution that presages clarity of meaning of
what the subject of the Revolution wants, the Rule of Law relies on
written legal texts, created through legislative compromise.
Ambiguity, gaps, and conflicts are inherent to the text, and
interpretation, with all its frustrating pursuit of the “intent of the
legislature,” is what haunts the subject of the Rule of Law.
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REVOLUTION-TRANSITION-RULE OF LAW

If all went well with Revolution, the common wisdom says the
transition from Revolution to Rule of Law would have been
smooth, with the demands of Revolution embodied in new
legislative texts and an honest independent judiciary. So what is it
that puts Egypt at this conjunction of Revolution and Rule of Law,
stuck right in the teasing middle, its various contending parties
using the Rule of Law to litigate Revolution, and using Revolution
to put Rule of Law on trial?17 Is the trouble with the Egyptian
“revolution” itself that it did not yield a smooth transition?
Perhaps one shouldn’t call it a Revolution after all?18 Is the trouble
with the very notion of transition—the assumption that Revolution
yields a transition that is in effect an interruption in time and
situation that eventually yields new legal texts and new judiciary?
Or, is the trouble with the idea of the Rule of Law itself and the
imagined respite it would deliver the Revolutionary once it is in
full bloom?
What is interesting, if not indeed ironic, is that the transitional
situation in which Egypt finds itself is in some ways the envy of
countries where the Rule of Law is thick and dominant. To be able
to judge the Rule of Law by the universals of Revolution, not so
remote in memory and not made invisible by legislative texts, is an
enviable position to be in. To have law appropriated and mastered
with confidence by the layman, whereby the role of judiciary is
eliminated altogether, is the dream of progressives in such
countries.
One might push the critical point even further and argue that
the idea that the Rule of Law will deliver a respite for the
revolutionary and a resting place for the Revolution is itself a form
of false consciousness. No such place exists. One might obtain an
honest and independent judiciary, but legislation passed by an
elected legislature and a counterrevolutionary situation prevails
nevertheless. Enemies of Revolution can as easily sneak right back
See supra notes 3 and 6.
Other scholars share similar doubts on the making of the revolution. See,
e.g., Tamir Moustafa, It’s Not a Revolution Yet, Posted in The Middle East Channel,
FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 28, 2011, 5:24 PM), http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/
posts/2011/02/28/it_s_not_a_revolution_yet
(discussing
the
proposed
amendments to the new Egyptian Constitution and Egypt’s precarious transition
to democracy).
17
18
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into control through proper law and an independent judiciary as
they can through military uniforms and anti-riot gear. And once
they do, they are in fact much more tightly locked in, having
acquired the legitimacy of the Rule of Law. At the end of the day,
aren’t visible displays of unjust power better than those that are
invisible?
“Revolution/Transition/Rule of Law” is an expression of a
time sequence that has captured the imagination of Egyptian
revolutionaries. There is nothing unrealistic or irrational about it.
Put in the simplest and most vulgar of terms, it is an expression of
a perfectly legitimate desire to have a proper and functioning state.
No sooner does Revolution size up the power of the authoritarian
state, showing the limits of its projected authority and the
hollowness of its inside through its acts of resistance and challenge,
than it seeks to seize state power to prop it up again, this time on
new terms, the terms of the Rule of Law. The trouble is that this
time sequence, rational and realistic, is also highly indeterminate.
The indeterminacy plagues each one of its terms—Revolution,
Transition, Rule of Law—as events that are disruptive of time and
situation.
The indeterminacy of the first term, Revolution,
implicates the other two terms, making the whole sequence
indeterminate.
10. INDETERMINATE REVOLUTION?
As soon as we ask whether what happened in Egypt was a
Revolution, we find our interpretation of the time sequence in the
aftermath of the overthrow of Mubarak—or what I call here,
“Transition”—indispensible to our answer. And if that time
sequence was pregnant with law and legalism(s), then our
interpretation of law and legalism also seems to play a role in
answering this question.
A possible answer is that what happened in Egypt was not a
Revolution, after all. Yes, the spectacle of the crowds in Tahrir—
persistent, passionate, creative, and brave—was stunning and
wondrous. The moment when Mubarak, in the face of the crowds’
persistent chants, finally conceded his throne was indeed
spectacular, but all of that did not amount to a Revolution. What
happened was simply a “tap” on an already imploding state. The
failure of the police to contain the gathering crowds was a signal of
the weakness of the state, a decline already proceeding apace for
several years before that crowning moment of spectacle. The
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crowds simply witnessed what those administering the state had
known all along—that its collapse was a question of time only.
Why is it that a “tap” on an imploding state does not amount to
Revolution? It is because it had no proper subject. While a kind of
media-generated consensus on calling it a Revolution quickly
formed, there was no force that could step up briskly and
forcefully after the fall of Mubarak to draw out the consequences of
the chant “Bread, Liberty and Social Justice.” No force could have,
because, as we have seen with the benefit of time after the fall, no
force did.
There was indeed a group of people who called themselves
“The Revolutionary Bloc” and the interpretation they offered of
“Bread, Liberty and Social Justice”—which they often supported
with their bodies in several altercations with the police in the
aftermath of the overthrow of Mubarak—was most
“revolutionary.”
But their spin proved solitary, utopian,
overdrawn, and unwarranted by the events that followed; namely,
state implosion followed by a dictator’s concession. The subject
necessary to tap an imploding state was very different from the
one required to create a rupture in situation. The former requires a
condensation of rage, otherwise diffuse, that quickly finds its
release in the achievement of the object at hand—the removal of
the dictator. The latter nurtures its resentment and rage in the
service of a universal idea, the consequences of which bleed out
over time. It amounted to a revolutionary demand before the
Revolution. The crowds had already departed!19
11. LAW IN THE SHADOW OF THE FALL
If one adopts the pessimistic take on the above interpretation,
one would have to eye with suspicion the law-filled time in the
aftermath of the Fall (of Mubarak). The legal density of the back
and forth that I described in the opening paragraph of this essay
can only trigger our suspicions. That is to say, it is neither a
species of the Rule of Law nor of Revolution. It is not of the former
19 Most of my ideas about revolution as disruption in time and situation—an
act that puts the state in its place and an event that elicits “universals” that require
a revolutionary subject to tease out—I take from the French philosopher Alain
Badiou. Badiou’s philosophical writings are dedicated to analytically deciphering
the meaning of revolution to which he attributes the capacity to yield “truths.”
For an elaboration of his ideas on revolution, see ALAIN BADIOU, BEING AND EVENT
(Oliver Feltham trans., Continuum ed. 2006) (1988).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2013

04_ABU ODEH (DO NOT DELETE)

356

4/9/2013 4:32 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 34:2

because it cannot effectively project state authority without which
the Rule of Law may not be performed persuasively. The state has
imploded and left the void in its tracks. To the contrary, all those
law-acts appear like a manic scramble for state authority—an
abundance of law to make up for the absence of the state. As if the
aggregate of state (legal) acts, be it in the form of law or legal
decisions, can bring an imploded state back to life!
Arguably, the scramble for the state—the desire to put the
fragments back together against the background of the Fall (rather
than the Revolution)—can be attributed to both those who
“tapped” the imploding state and those who lost their authority
with the implosion. For the latter, legalizing their power, even as a
thin veneer similar to that under the dictatorship, was too hard to
resist. Indeed, it was business as usual. For the former, the “sizing
up” of the state may have been so terrifying that the dread of the
void soon displaced the pleasure of overthrowing a dictator. The
desire for state authority quickly reinstated itself. Those who lost
their authority may be acting in a sinister fashion, claiming power
back through law, while those who tapped the imploding state,
look for good authority through law and litigation. It is this
conjoint desire for the state that fills the post-Fall period with
dense law-acts.
This kind of Rule of Law performance would take place outside
the constraint of the universal: no Revolution had taken place, after
all. A dictator fell, revealing the weakness of the state he presided
over. This was no productive rupture that would set forth a new
situation under the constraints of different norms. Authoritarian
law, punctured by certain legal concessions, can be reinstated with
a view to accommodating the now diffuse rage of the
demonstrators. Military trials of demonstrators can continue while
a reorganization of the police and the Ministry of Interior is
conceded to the public to make it more transparent and less
arbitrary.20 Meanwhile Mubarak’s trial takes place, albeit in

20 Approximately twelve thousand Egyptians were tried by military courts
between Feb. 11, 2011 when SCAF assumed power and August 2011. Countless
others were also tried militarily before Morsi was elected in June 2012. See Egypt:
President Must Go Beyond Decree and Carry Out Greater Human Rights Reform,
AMNESTY INT’L, (Oct. 9, 2012), https://www.amnesty.org/en/news/egyptpresident-2012-10-09 (explaining that about). For a description of the military
endeavor to revive the emergency rules, see supra note 8.
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civilian courts and only for those crimes committed in Tahrir.21
The dictator is “under arrest,” but is spending his time in a
military hospital for “health reasons.” The usual practice of
managing the state—splitting the difference and then splitting it
again within the original split and so forth—is back. This time, the
difference is being split between two pressing considerations: on
one side, the exigencies of cementing state power without radically
reorganizing its practice; on the other, accommodating public
discontent. The absence of Revolution makes the resurfacing of
this state managerial style less outrageous given its manic,
overcompensating quality. Repeating with intensity what had
been the case before produces an air of urgency rather than
normalcy. A state had just imploded!
12. LAW IN THE SHADOW OF REVOLUTION
The above interpretation can be given a more nuanced and
optimistic spin by insisting that, while all the above was true (i.e.,
that Tahrir was no more than a tap on an imploding state) and that
the revolutionary bloc that emerged afterwards was guilty of an
overbearing reading of the flash event of Tahrir; nevertheless, this
reading could match the event through willful operation and
diligent political work. This would insist on projecting Revolution
backwards and forwards: “It was a Revolution, therefore it is,
therefore it will be!” By tirelessly reminding Egyptians of the
consequences of Tahrir when they had sized up the power of their
state, by insisting that the distance between sizing up the state and
seizing it was a very short one, and by convincing Egyptians that
they can run, walk, or crawl that one last mile, but that they do so
is a must—Revolution it will be!
If one adopts this more optimistic spin of what happened in
Tahrir, one would have to see the law-filled time in the aftermath
of the Revolution as more complex, with the conflict of interests
between those who lost and those who gained heightened, as each
is now laboring under the constraint of the universal unleashed by
Revolution. For those who lost, law becomes a means through
which the universal is blocked. The tendency of the Rule of Law to
siphon off any political influence outside its domain is most
convenient for those purposes.
For those who lost, the
21 Egypt: Mubarak Verdict Fails to Deliver Full Justice, AMNESTY INT’L, (June 2,
2012), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/egypt-mubarak-2012-06-02.
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introduction of law—either good or bad law, early on in the
process—is a means for derailing the normative pressure of the
universal given the self-referential and extreme textuality of the
law. The faster one moves toward law and legal performances, the
sooner one departs from revolutionary times.
The legal
performance calls upon the state to respect the radical
egalitarianism of the collective in Tahrir, while the law itself
counters with its own textually constrained notion of
egalitarianism, which will inevitably fall short.
For those who won, the move to law is desired in a double, but
ultimately contradictory, sense. On the one hand, the Rule of Law
with all that it implies is one of the enunciated goals of the
Revolution. As I mentioned earlier, the desire for the Rule of Law
is part of the desire for a decent and functioning state that most
Egyptians covet. On the other hand, Rule of Law is seen as a
means: to utilize the porous quality of the law at this early stage, to
infuse law with the universal (to which it lives in temporal
proximity), to insist that that law should echo as much as possible
the commands of the universal, and to insist that law’s textuality
should be interpreted under its constraint. These are contradictory
desires on the part of the revolutionary camp because, having the
one, politico-phobic Rule of Law, they need to give up the latter,
law constrained by the universal, and vice-versa.
To have the Rule of Law in a state that labored for decades
under dictatorships is itself so revolutionary that the attributes of
Revolution are given to the Rule of Law mistakenly and in an
idealizing fashion. Beginnings as presaging birth of the new have
their own political aesthetics, and collapsing differences through
idealization might be one of them!
Note how attributing the quality of Revolution to the removal
of Mubarak and the implosion of the authoritarian state sharpen
the degree of conflict between the forces of the old and the forces of
the new and make law-acts that would otherwise appear to be runof-the-mill, difference-splitting, state management styles appear
more assaultive and deliberate. For they become more than a
scramble for state authority; they are attempts at containing the
revolutionary tide. Given the inherently conservative nature of the
Rule of Law as a sphere that blocks the political, the early entry
into the Rule of Law domain soon after the events in Tahrir would
seem to transport unresolved political conflicts into the more
secure (for the old forces) domain of the law. This is not because
the judiciary is not independent and is still acting to please the old
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political forces as the Revolutionary wisdom has it, but because the
judiciary might choose to become independent from politics
precisely by blocking off the influence of the Revolution as an
event that constrains its interpretation of law. By doing that, it
would be most faithful to its judicial role and therefore most
persuasive in its Rule of Law performances. On the revolutionary
side, on the other hand, this early immersion into law, while
seemingly promising a Rule of Law-coveted universe, amounts to
an invitation to law before the maturation of the universals of the
Revolution. The worst that could happen to a Revolution with
weak subjects, whose Revolution teeters between self-inflicted
implosion and revolutionary acts, is to be inducted into the Rule of
Law before the revolutionaries have worked out the implications
of their actions. It is the entry into the “written” when they have
barely had time to enunciate the words of Revolution.
13. LAW IN THE SHADOW OF DEMOCRACY
That what happened in Tahrir was indeed a revolution but a
very specific one, namely, a popular Revolution for democracy, is
by far the most popular interpretation of the events in Tahrir. This
interpretation, while insisting on the revolutionary nature of the
Tahrir events, limits the range of the universals to be read out of
them into one universal: namely, Democracy. Indeed, what else
could be read out of the toppling of a dictator but the desire for
political freedom, the freedom to choose one’s representatives?
Democracy, according to this interpretation, enters as a mediating
term between Revolution and the Rule of Law. The former is
overridden by the choices democracy yields (the populace elects its
political representatives); they come to stand in for whatever
revolutionary potential there was. The latter is treated as a species
of democracy (elected representatives pass laws that are applied by
an independent judiciary) and one of its organic effects.
Democracy is inserted here with its own logic that is
independent of that of Revolution and the Rule of Law. A
Revolution for Democracy is one that subordinates all its potential
universals to the one of “choice.” “Choice by the greatest number”
is its most privileged term that functions as its sole universal. The
arrangements that put democracy in place are designed to mine the
consequences of this one solitary universal: “choice.” It is form to
Revolution’s content; procedure to Revolution’s substance;
nihilism to Revolution’s faith. This is nothing to scoff at, as choice
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is an expression of freedom, the practice of which is highly
revolutionary in the aftermath of a dictatorship.
Perhaps the most corrosive effect Democracy has on Revolution
is that the democratic choice by the populace comes to seal the
otherwise indeterminate events in Tahrir by offering its own
retrospective interpretation of those events. That its choice might
fall on a party (the Muslim Brotherhood) that had hedged Tahrir,
rather than participated un-ambivalently in it, one whose reaction
to those events could best be described as “obscure” and at worst
antagonistic, is even the more sobering for those insisting on flying
a narrative-balloon above Tahrir with the word “REVOLUTION”
inscribed on it. More alarming still is the way the democratic
choice suggests that what happened was more of a “tap” on an
imploding state rather than Revolution—the tectonic plates moved
and the next political force standing in line popped up, before they
settled down again. No universals were reported from the scene.
While on the one hand, the Rule of Law is considered as an
organic effect of the practice of Democracy, Democracy can have
no less of a corrosive effect on the Rule of Law, seen as its twin,
than it does on Revolution. The legalization of dictatorial rule, or
law as a means to practice authoritarian governance,22 was without
doubt a burdensome legacy that Egyptians seem happy to be rid of
with Mubarak’s departure. But popular choice can turn and
negate itself by choosing a supreme authority, such as God, to
oversee the government’s worldly choices. While the legislative
machinery produced by Egypt’s first elections has not yet yielded
enough legislation to judge how the Rule of Law under the reign of
Democracy will fare, there are indications that unelected
institutions such as Al-Azhar will be given supreme authority over
Parliament to review compliance of democratically passed laws
with Sharia law.23 This system offers no less of a Rule of Law
22 See Abu Odeh, supra note 14, at 992–95 (describing the role of the Supreme
Constitutional Court of Egypt in Mubarak’s authoritarian regime).
23 Article 4 of Egypt’s draft constitution enshrines the role of Al-Azhar as an
“independent institution” and states that the opinions of the Senior Ulama Body
will be taken in matters pertaining to Islamic law. [Editor’s Note: Egypt’s State
Information Service has not yet published on its website the new Constitution of
Egypt, signed into law by President Morsi on December 26, 2012. For alternative
translations of the November 30 draft constitution that Morsi signed, see Nariman
Youssef, Egypt’s Draft Constitution Translated, EGYPT INDEPENDENT (Dec. 2, 2012,
1:15 PM), http://www.egyptindependent.com/print/1278681; The New
Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt, http://www.constitutionnet.org/
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except that it is one whereby the worldly lawgiver has willingly
delegated some of its powers to another for guidance.
While the choice of democracy can have a double corrosive
effect—one retrospectively on how to understand the events of
Tahrir, and one prospectively on the Rule of Law—this is not
altogether without limit. A commitment to democracy and the
Rule of Law in the aftermath of the toppling of a dictator would
seem to drag with it a constellation of ideas, universally settled,
about what they mean.
The uneasy relationship between
democracy and “rights” is a staple of such constellations, inherited
from Revolutions at other times in other places. If the choice of
democracy has the power to eliminate other universals from
Tahrir, it nevertheless has to contend with universals imprinted in
the institutions of democracy, “rights” being the most basic. This
would allow for a possible destabilization of democratic choice and
its legislative embodiments, not from a source outside of the
democratic government, but from deep inside of it through the
settled legal trends of Revolutions elsewhere that have become
legally “universalized.”
“Rights” are open to interpretation and allow for possible
constellations of liberties and entitlements that move from radical
to liberal to conservative on the political spectrum, and can be the
basis for another Revolution on different terms. This time,
Revolution comes from inside a settled discourse with its debates
already drawn out in other contexts. These debates can provide
legitimate oppositional language that diffuse revolutionary forces
can latch onto to compensate for their initial weakness. The
drafting of a new constitution after the fall of a dictator becomes a
compensatory event that through the language of Rights utilized
now with some urgency, allows for the universals of Tahrir to be
revisited, recited, and rehashed through the particular public
“choice” of democracy.
14. CONCLUSION
By the time I finished writing this paper, Morsi, the Muslim
Brotherhood’s first democratically elected president of Egypt, had

files/final_constitution_30_nov_2012_-english-_-idea.pdf; The 2012 Constitution of
Egypt, Translated by Nivien Saleh, with Index, http://niviensaleh.info/constitutionegypt-2012-translation/.]
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disbanded SCAF.24 SCAF had taken over the state in the aftermath
of Mubarak’s fall and assumed the role of the caretaker of the
transition to democracy. SCAF’s rule was considered highly
suspect given the heightened reliance on law to cement military
control over the country. SCAF was generally regarded as
representing the network of interests that were prominent under
Mubarak, now seeking to re-establish power on new terms. The
ease with which the dismantlement of SCAF took place and the
almost complete absence of resistance on the part of SCAF is hard
to interpret at this point. Some argue that Morsi’s act is
tantamount to finishing an unfinished revolution—a daring act
that would not have been possible if it were not for the spirit of
“Tahrir” and the multiple violent encounters with the army by the
revolutionary forces.
It was the Revolution that inspired,
produced, and directed its own final act. Others opine that while
the political representative of the interests has been removed, the
network itself has not been eliminated. They argue that the
Muslim Brotherhood seeks to replace its own network in its stead,
or alternatively, seek to edge its own network inside the old one to
create a new partnership. This analysis relies on the fact that the
Brotherhood is adopting the same economic policies of the
Mubarak regime (with minor differences) and is already showing
signs of authoritarian control over political opposition. The fact
that such policies will aggravate the already difficult lives of the
struggling masses and threaten to send them back to the streets
again with a renewed round of repression from the state, means
that little has changed in Egypt.
Such arguments raise the specter that haunts Egypt and which
I have tried to capture in this paper—namely, the
indeterminateness of what happened in Egypt that led to the fall of
Mubarak, which is a question that cannot be settled without an
interpretation of the events that followed the Fall and the law-acts
that permeated this time sequence. One can either use the
language of “revolution-over-time” or “revolution-counter24 In August 2012 the president decided to revoke the supplementary
declaration issued by SCAF and “retire” the heads of SCAF. See Morsi’s Ramadan
Surprise: Q&A with Nathan J. Brown, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (Aug.
13,
2012),
http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2012/08/13/
morsi%e2%80%99s-ramadan-surprise.
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revolution-back-to-revolution” sequence or “popular revolution”
to describe what happened and what continues to unfold. What
causes the indeterminateness is what the left has come to call “the
weakness of the Revolutionary forces,” or what I call the ambiguity
of the subject of Revolution. It is my view that Egypt lives within
the gravitational field of implosion, Revolution, and popular
revolution for democracy, all at the same time, and that this
indeterminateness will not be settled soon.
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